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1. Introduction
The compelling task of the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) after the disasters 
of the Maoist regime was to reform both the 
economy and the instruments of government 
toward a set of far more effective institutions. 
Chinese governments and indeed all of China’s 
society had been perverted by the commune 
movement so that it was not until Mao died 
in 1976 that the successor political leader-
ship could safely begin a purge of government 
structure, procedures and workforce. The CCP 
finally realized that it had created a monster – 
truly the worst government in the world.  One 
of the great truths for the Chinese people is the 
fact that, whatever their dissatisfactions with 
their current government, everything – every-
thing – was far worse under Mao.  
The Maoist mess existed at all government 
levels:  national, provincial, township, county 
and municipality. Three things were critical: 
first, the amateur apparatus of communes, 
collectives, work brigades and so forth had 
quietly to be dismantled with a minimum of 
political turmoil.  Second, thousands of lo-
cal governments had to build up sturdier and 
more professional local administrations, ca-
pable of taking on a far more complex range 
of public responsibilities.  But this had to be 
accomplished in a country in which few had 
an adequate education, and more than 80% 
were still illiterate. Third, the whole financial 
system of revenues, expenditures and man-
agement of the flow of funds had to be gotten 
under control.
These are the most serious forms of govern-
ment corruption:   
 ▪ Special interest politics
 ▪ Government contracting
 ▪ Government property lease or sale
 ▪ Customs fees for both imports and exports
 ▪ Tax system, with many types and levels of 
taxation
 ▪ Budget earmarks and set asides
 ▪ Abuse of the power to authorize expendi-
tures
 ▪ Bribery – sought and paid
 ▪ Populism – government largess to seek sup-
port and to buy votes
 ▪ Overblown and false financial charges from 
government
 ▪ Fraud, kickbacks
 ▪ Theft
 ▪ Redundancy in employment in government 
agencies, state owned enterprises, and con-
tractors
 ▪ Extortion:  by police, regulators, judges, pol-
iticians
 ▪ Rakeoffs of false or excessive profits from 
government business
After Mao, the structures of all Chinese gov-
ernments had to be thoroughly reorganized 
from top to bottom to eliminate hundreds of 
thousands of obsolete, useless, dysfunction-
al and incompetent collectives, communes, 
“struggle groups” and other strange units and 
activities.  The first wave of such structural 
reform was initiated in the early 80s and still 
continues, and it was justified politically be-
cause the Maoist structure was horribly inef-
ficient, and because it could be argued that it 
was no longer necessary to “guard the revolu-
tion”.  The shift to a market economy meant 
that whole ministries that controlled sectors 
of the economy (e. g. Coal, or Electric Power, 
or Machine Building) were now obsolete and 
redundant and could simply be eliminated, 
or folded into a general organization called 
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the State Economic and Trade Commission, 
which dealt with policy and not operations. 
Structural rationalization in turn justified 
and facilitated the purging of the public work-
force, keeping the competent where possible, 
but weeding out the uneducated, ignorant, or 
totally inexperienced.  Another crucial prin-
ciple of reform involved a total shift from the 
communist/socialist philosophy of “cradle to 
grave” government to place more emphasis 
on individual self reliance-- and thus less re-
liance on government.  This Maoist monster 
lacked almost any effective management con-
trols, and it continued to be driven by the ac-
tive efforts of both politicians and managers to 
perpetuate and enlarge their empires and steal 
from the public purse.  In addition, this mon-
ster bureaucracy was also effectively in charge 
of another monster – the thousands of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), a high proportion 
of which were running at deficits, and most of 
which were hot beds of corruption. Faced with 
these prodigious problems, it became politi-
cally attractive simply to deny responsibility 
for them.  Both individuals and institutions 
like SOEs and local governments were being 
told to practice self reliance.
2. Excuses to justify corruption
A disturbing number of governments in 
the world are bad:  they are corrupt, tyranni-
cal, incompetent, or destructive. Authoritar-
ian, self-serving leaders misallocate national 
resources, steal elections, terrorize citizens, 
and line their own pockets.  Social programs 
are neglected, and the will of the people is ig-
nored. Thus, corruption has many meanings, 
and it becomes far more widespread and poor-
ly resisted in bad regimes.  Democracy and the 
rule of law are denied, and pathological activi-
ties are made legal.  Regulations, instead of 
protecting the public, become instruments of 
tyranny and petty bureaucracy. 
How do these things happen?  Why do gov-
ernments become pathological and corrupt? 
Lots of people have invented lots of excuses to 
“justify” corruption, or explain it away.  Here 
are some of the most popular.
1. “Corruption is a way of life; it has been 
‘built in’ to the culture.”  Some countries/cul-
tures are victimized by such widespread cor-
ruption that it is interpreted to be part of the 
culture, and therefore somehow acceptable. 
But in a deeper sense, it is clear that no soci-
ety in history has really endorsed corruption; 
all consider it wrong; every religion or secular 
philosophy condemns it; and the laws of most 
countries make it specifically illegal.   So the 
“way of life” argument is merely a feeble ratio-
nalization when tested by these broader soci-
etal views.
2.  “Everybody does it; how can you stop 
‘everybody’ “?  But it is not true that everybody 
does it.   Most people are remarkably honest, 
hate corruption, oppose it where possible, 
hate to be its victims, and will support anti-
corruption efforts.
3.  “Corruption has its advantages”.  This 
kind of argument has been advanced by both 
political scientists and corporations.  The cor-
porations argue (especially around tax time) 
that bribery is a necessary business tool to 
avoid bureaucratic process and help to gain 
business.  Corruption is often seen as cheaper 
than complying with laws and regulations and 
business people argue that “if we don’t bribe 
corrupt officials, our competition will.”  Po-
litical scientists may have given up, decided 
that corruption in inevitable and therefore is 
justified to get the bureaucratic apparatus to 
perform.  But the wheels do not have to be 
greased; most government programs can and 
do function well without the grease of corrup-
tion, and accepting and using corruption sim-
ply encourages more of it.
4.  “Fighting corruption is too expensive 
and difficult”.  Where corruption is wide-
spread and systematic, the means to eliminate 
or reduce it become so difficult and expensive 
that governments begin to believe that they 
cannot afford to eradicate it.  But the cost of 
corruption exceeds the cost of reduction many 
times over; a corrupt government is never a 
“cost-effective” government, nor is it serving 
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the public interest. Desperately scarce public 
funds are diverted into the bank accounts of 
cynical crooks, and vital public programs see 
their money stolen.
5.  “In a truly representative government, 
democratic practices will cause corruption to 
disappear”.  Corruption can exist even in a tru-
ly democratic government.  Hopefully, one of 
the adjuncts of a truly democratic government 
will be openness, transparency, lots of watch-
ers, and managerial measures to fight corrup-
tion.  But these means must be deliberately 
cultivated and will not happen spontaneously 
because a government has the democratic ap-
paratus.
6.  “In a truly market based economy, the 
forces of the market place will cause corrup-
tion to wither and die”.   Corruption is perfect-
ly capable of flourishing in a market economy 
because a market economy can contain patho-
logical forces which find corruption useful and 
profitable -- just as it does with straight crime, 
or “cheating.” When corruption becomes a 
means for the allocation of business/resourc-
es, it ceases to be a “market” economy, and 
becomes something else.  Bribery provides a 
way to beat competitors who may have better 
skills or lower costs.  The costs of the bribes 
becomes built into tax deductible business ex-
penses, and is another form of tax on citizens, 
while being essentially free for the corruptors. 
Currently, only the U. S. makes bribery of for-
eign officials a crime.
7.  “It is not clear exactly what ‘corruption’ 
means”.   This suggests that governments can’t 
really take full measures to oppose corruption 
because there may be grey areas or areas of le-
gal uncertainty as to what is wrong and what is 
not.  But in most cases, what is corrupt/path-
ological in government is much the same as 
what is seen as corrupt/pathological in society 
and there is a broad range of known corrupt 
practices that can be attacked immediately 
without waiting for the perfect legal certainty. 
If it is not certain whether some kinds of ac-
tivities are corrupt or not, then specific legal 
actions are available to make that determina-
tion if there is the guts to do so.
8.  Corruption is a way to get even; for star-
vation wages, for failures of public services, for 
lives of desperation.  “Steal or starve”.  But this 
does not cure the main problems, and may just 
make them worse.
9.  The needs of family/clan/tribe are top 
priority and must be served even at the cost of 
violating somebody’s rules about what is right. 
So the dumb nephew gets a job illegally, and 
the brother gets the illegal contract.  Accord-
ing to Smith (p85), “ – the immediate inter-
ests of assisting family, friends, and allies usu-
ally trump a more abstract awareness of what 
might be in the best interests of the larger so-
ciety.”  Family/friends,  “Kinship--- loyalty – 
reciprocity.”- - are far more important than 
what is seen as an impersonal, unsympathet-
ic, corrupt and often inefficient bureaucracy. 
Further, the squeeze placed on civil servants 
by insufficient and delayed salaries, rapid in-
flation and the rising costs of family life cre-
ate immense pressures to be corrupt.  In addi-
tion, many government offices are deliberately 
understaffed and underfunded by politicians 
who can then claim “fiscal prudence”.  Finally, 
many see even this questionable system of pa-
tron-clientism as breaking down because the 
patrons are abandoning their sense of obliga-
tion and are turning to simple overwhelming 
greed.  
Obviously, even with this change of policy, 
the bulk of China’s institutions remained un-
der the control of the CCP and the central gov-
ernment, but control was to be exercised in 
less direct and more subtle ways.  The owner-
ship of land was retained by the government, 
and control of land use is one of the most 
powerful control tools of local government, as 
well as one of the most profitable. The govern-
ment has also fully appreciated the powerful 
leverage that can be exerted through regula-
tion.  Public regulation is usually justified as 
necessary to protect public health and safety, 
and indeed it serves that purpose.  But if the 
government is bent on the preservation of its 
power, it quickly realizes that new regulations 
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represent new power.  Land use regulations 
allow the government to control who uses gov-
ernment land and for what purpose.  Environ-
mental regulations can be used as a weapon to 
control private industry.  Banking regulations 
extend the power of the government to manip-
ulate lending practices.
Why is corruption so all-pervasive in Chi-
na?  To begin with, corruption has a long, long 
history, including the whole modern era from 
the latter stages of the Manchu dynasty in the 
late 1900s, through the failed republic up to 
WW II, through the unbelievably destructive 
Maoist era and right up to today which means 
that the Chinese people have never seen a gov-
ernment that was not corrupt. Public officials 
have no recent history or solid grounding in 
the ethics of public service.  Their prevailing 
framework has been to obey orders from the 
top, curry favor, never get out of line, go along 
to get along in order to survive.  Nobody has 
really been pressing the view that laws should 
adhere closely to the needs and desires of the 
people and their views of what is proper in so-
ciety instead of the views of the Party.   Because 
career public officials are not valued, salaries 
and benefits have been notoriously poor, and 
officials learned that the good things in life 
were not going to come from government gen-
erosity.  Every day, everybody rubs up against 
others who are experts on corruption, and cor-
ruption is seen as a high and valued skill.
Corruption all too often starts at the top. 
Senior politicians, heads of state owned enter-
prises, heads of local governments, contract-
ing officials, financial controllers, senior police 
officers, inspectors and auditors are seen to be 
corrupt.  Thousands of cases over time reveal 
the universal application of the skills of cor-
ruption. To be honest is to appear to be timid 
or slow witted. Therefore, when politicians rail 
against corruption, they are seen as hypocriti-
cal liars. 
Corruption is simply too profitable, and 
paradoxically, this is especially true in a poor 
country.  It is clear now that the controls of the 
CCP over their State Owned Enterprises have 
been woefully inadequate (often deliberately) 
and they have consequently become havens for 
pathological practices and failed management. 
The CCP and central government has placed 
impossible burdens on provinces, townships, 
and cities, but they have refused to allow them 
the means to finance these burdens. Under the 
pressures of inadequate funding, many local 
government officials engage in “legal” corrup-
tion.  They will strip assets out of SOEs and sell 
them.  They will offer government contracts to 
the highest briber; they will enter into illegal 
land leases, engage in smuggling, or charge 
fake fees to generate revenues.  These officials 
are using public taxes to invest in business en-
terprises both legal and illegal, and while most 
of the profits flow back into public enterprises, 
some percentage of the revenues manages to 
end up in private bank accounts.
3. The Chinese government: 
unyielding top down control
The theology of state socialism has proved 
to be the ideal intellectual and operational jus-
tification for centrist, top down control.  The 
whole structure of government was designed 
to exert this control from top to bottom.  The 
CCP established a second parallel “govern-
ment” at all levels.  Down the hall from every 
provincial governor was the office of the pro-
vincial Party chief.  Down the hall from every 
city mayor was the Party chief.  The heads of 
most local governments at all levels were se-
lected and appointed by the CCP.  The system 
required a strict upward reporting relation-
ship in every aspect of government.  Not only 
did local government leaders report upward, 
but, for example, budget officers at the city 
level reported to budget officials at the coun-
ty level who reported to the budget officer at 
the provincial level, who reported to officials 
in the national government – who reported to 
the CCP.  The enormous array of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) were all headed by officers 
appointed by the Party.  A series of cross-cut-
ting agencies, commissions and bureaus exer-
cised large and unspecified authorities.  The 
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result has been a massive bureaucratic com-
plexity which results in confusion, delay, mis-
management and high cost.
In addition, a large number of “mass or-
ganizations” were created and controlled by 
the State such as the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, 
the All China Women’s Federation, and many 
more.  These were largely financed by the cen-
tral government at great cost, for control pur-
poses and to fend off genuinely independent 
organizations. Also there have been about 1.3 
million “affiliated organizations” established 
such as industry associations, research institu-
tions, universities and other schools, media or-
ganizations, publishing houses, social services 
organizations, hospitals, engineering “compa-
nies” and many others.  These organizations 
have included many service entities such as 
accountants, lawyers, training centers, audit-
ing firms and more. In total, these organiza-
tions employed just under 30 million people, 
most of them overseen by local governments. 
Very importantly, Chinese officials at all 
levels of government have gotten involved 
in industrial and commercial development 
by creating enterprises and making public 
investments.  This did indeed stimulate the 
economy, but created powerful interests that 
profited from incomplete markets, faulty reg-
ulations, and political interventions. Most of 
these development enterprises have the pow-
er to raise money, and they have undertaken 
huge mounds of highly questionable debt.   It’s 
as if the referees and guardians have turned 
into players.
Note that the corrupt officaldom that had 
functioned under the old command and con-
trol systen turned smoothly and quickly to 
become corrupters under the new market 
system. There has been extreme difficulty in 
changing the mind set of the old holders of 
power, for both legitimate and perverse mo-
tives
The long history of bad government and the 
weakened capacity of Chinese governments 
at the local level have fed the growth of cor-
ruption.  The commonly accepted attributes 
of good government discussed below are also 
among the strongest ways to prevent or miti-
gate corruption, but it is often the CCP itself 
that is the force that has prevented the intro-
duction of many of these good government ap-
proaches.
The CCP has created an added element of 
widely recognized hypocrisy when it attempts 
to declare itself to be blameless, and attempts 
to shift the blame for all corruption some-
where else, preferably onto local government 
officials.  Yet in a government where the CCP 
has exercised dictatorial control over every-
thing for almost 60 years, few can really be-
lieve that it did not instigate and benefit from 
these corrupt activities. The CCP certainly 
knows what the attributes of good government 
are.  In some cases, they may concede the need 
for some level of acceptance of these attributes 
over time, but often, the appearance of change 
is as good as change itself, and the CCP has 
beenskilled at permitting as little real change 
as possible.  The whole intellectual base of 
thinking of the CCP and most government of-
ficials remains anchored on centrism, power 
retention and control.  It seems very hard to 
instill the concept in the minds of the political 
leadership that laws should be aimed at the fa-
cilitation of people’s needs through empower-
ment, rather than a base of laws that restrict, 
constrain and prevent.  
Will the CCP survive in its present form? 
Even more seriously, will the Peoples Repub-
lic survive in its present form?  If not, why 
not?  Remarkably, “both Hu Jintao, the former 
president, and Xi Jinping, the current one, 
have recently issued dire warnings that cor-
ruption could lead to the collapse of the Party 
and the State.”
4. What drives corruption?
It has been argued that not everything that 
is corrupt is necessarily illegal or immoral.  It 
is useful here to introduce the concept of gov-
ernment pathology. Every form of government 
ever invented has proved highly vulnerable to 
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pathological behavior. In the dictionary sense, 
pathology is defined as conditions of abnor-
mality and/or deviations from propriety, or 
the assumed normal state of things. Patho-
logical means diseased. Thus, a pathological 
government is one that has become sick and 
malfunctioning -- based on some definition of 
what is healthy and normal.  One of the dis-
eases of pathological governments is corrup-
tion, which, at its simplest, is defined as  per-
formance of an illegal act in violation of duty, 
induced by improper means.  In government, 
it involves deriving personal and private gain 
from the exercise of official duty, or acts by 
others to induce a government official to act 
illegally or improperly in violation of duty. 
Under this rubric, many policies and actions 
of governments may be legal, but nevertheless 
produce corrupt and dysfunctional outcomes, 
according to the most broadly accepted judg-
ments of those outcomes applied by society. 
For example, many countries have passed laws 
which prohibit elections and/or permit only 
one political party.  These laws are declared by 
their initiators to be wise and just, but by the 
judgment of most of humanity, they are patho-
logical and corrupt.
Are their circumstances under which cor-
ruption is acceptable?  Maybe four:
1.  Where there is a framework of governance 
that is declared to be legitimate, but proves to 
be pathological.  Consider the example of the 
Communist regime of more than seventy years 
in the Soviet Union, or the China under the 
rule of Mao Zedong, or many governments un-
der the “divine right of kings”.  People within 
these frameworks may see them as legitimate, 
while the rest of the world recognizes them are 
horribly wrong.
2.  A support for a cause.  Think perhaps 
about a potential government ruled by a fierce-
ly fundamentalist Islamic leadership.  Such a 
regime would be justified as the will of Allah, 
but, in the broadest of human terms, it would 
have the potential for pathology, stoutly jus-
tified and maintained, and history shows that 
such zeal overpowers the normal limits on ac-
tions which society hopes to experience.
3.  A different sense of obligation.   Gov-
ernments make rules and insist that they be 
obeyed.  But there are other “rules” in this 
world, and they may be seen as more compel-
ling.  As an example, think of people living in 
some country in abject poverty.  They may de-
cide to cheat a little, or steal a little in order to 
feed their children.  They would have broken 
some “rules”, but obviously to them survival is 
the only rule, and they see government rules as 
the weapons of their miserable leaders.  They 
have acted corruptly – but are they wrong?  A 
poorly paid policeman accepts a bribe; a mi-
nor government official takes a kickback so he 
can pay the rent.  The needs of family or tribe 
or community are seen as far more important 
than the harsh bureaucratic processes of a dis-
trusted government.  To survive is far more 
important than to obey the rules.
4.  Incompetence.  Running an honest and 
effective government is very difficult, and sad-
ly, many politicians and government officials 
are not up to the task.  But to be bumbling 
and incompetent, or inexperienced or igno-
rant may produce corrupt results, but they are 
not corrupt.  On the other hand, if an official 
knowingly gives a job to his dumb brother-
in-law ------!  Many a business will tell tales 
about how they have to pay “speed bribes” to 
get some permit or approval.
Beyond this point, all other drivers of cor-
ruption are improper and intolerable.  Here 
are the most powerful of these drivers.
1.  Corruption as a contributor to the search 
for power and leverage.  Some people are eas-
ier to buy than to persuade.  Corruption can 
produce the money used to buy support and 
“loyalty”, please potential voters, influence or-
ganizations, block opposition, and swing elec-
tions. When large sums of money are needed, 
it is often faster and easier to steal it than to 
earn it.  Loyalty here is meant in the sense of 
some degree of support for a ruling regime. 
The most “loyal” supporters are those who are 
inside of the ruling elite itself. The next level 
of “loyalty” is among people and organizations 
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who have influence and can deliver something 
the ruling regime wants or needs.  The “loy-
alty” of most of the people is situational, and 
in many countries, irrelevant.
2.  Greed.  The yearning for self enrichment 
is almost universal, and very many people are 
more than happy to succumb.  Greed works 
well at all levels of government, both from the 
top down and from the bottom up.  Just as you 
can’t cure stupid, you can’t fully cure greed. 
The general public in a country usually re-
gards greed as tolerable if legal, but highly im-
moral when violating public trust.  Yet, there 
is a seemingly endless stream of those who are 
illegally and implacably greedy, and they are 
endlessly daring and innovative.
The worst organizations are those where 
the corruption starts at, or comes to involve 
those at the very top.  When this is apparent, 
it seems to generate a contagion.  People at 
the lower ranks begin to say “If them, why not 
me? If the top people can break the rules, then 
there really are no rules.  They got theirs; now 
I’m going to get mine!”
A special aspect of the virtues of greed comes 
from dealings with international organiza-
tions, both public and private, who are will-
ing to make grants or loans, to support other 
governments for both humanitarian and eco-
nomic development motivations. This is often 
viewed at “free money” and the temptations to 
take advantage of some naïve motivations to 
fleece the unwary is usually irresistible. 
3.  Special interest politics.  Most people as-
sess governments in terms of their structural 
integrity and their body of laws, and yet reality 
often is that these elements are largely irrel-
evant.  Some of the most corrupt governments 
in the world have beautifully crafted Constitu-
tions, and bi-cameral legislatures, and elected 
presidents, and Supreme Courts, supposedly 
enforcing a body of formally enacted enabling 
legislation.  But all of this can be, and often is, 
meaningless. Constitutions can be largely ig-
nored. Laws may be blatantly violated, even by 
the governments that enacted them. The Rule 
of Law is never enough because the laws them-
selves can be corrupt and pathological, so to 
“obey the law” is to enforce pathology.
So what does drive the functioning of gov-
ernment?  It is the ubiquitous influence of 
special interest politics.  Whole governments, 
such as those of China, Indonesia, and the 
former Iraq, or the present Iran or Russia or 
Nigeria are largely the sum of all of the con-
sequences of what special interests in the 
country can extrude for themselves out of the 
political system.  Special interests are not de-
signed to advance the general public interest, 
but to advance the narrow interests of some 
person or group.  No government, not even the 
tightest of dictatorships, is free from this form 
of political pressure, certainly not the United 
States governments at all levels.
These special interests are not just private 
businesses.  Special interest groups include 
advocates of civil rights, environmental pro-
tection, minority citizens, small businesses, 
school teachers, unions, the poor, illegal im-
migrants, lawyers, states, counties, cities, po-
lice, the military – in fact, almost everybody 
but “the general public.”  These special inter-
ests seek money or preferment, or protection, 
or services or advantage over opponents.
It is not surprising then that reality is that a 
disturbingly large number of these special in-
terest accommodations are seen as pathologi-
cal and/or merely corrupt.  In many countries, 
it is almost “normal” for special interest groups 
to trade money and other support for the rul-
ing elite in exchange for lucrative and often 
illegal special treatment.  Bribes are offered 
and accepted.  Contracts are “swung”.  Land 
acquisition deals are manipulated. Taxes are 
manipulated or forgotten.  Debts are forgiven. 
Regulations are ignored.  Unions and teachers 
groups are given advantages in the workplace. 
Local governments – states, provinces, coun-
ties, districts, cities, villages –are the winners 
of large grants of money.  What is more, it is 
the serious ambition of special interest groups 
to get their preferment locked into laws which 
can be stoutly defended so that their advan-
tage goes on forever.
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4.  Criminal involvement.   Organized 
crime has morphed into politics and pros-
pered, in many countries despite hundreds of 
thousands of police and spies trying to prevent 
it.
Another major way in which the Chinese 
government has sought to retain control of 
the economy is to continue the policy of state 
ownership and control of almost all land.  This 
gives the government control of who is al-
lowed to use the land, and thus it has control 
over the location and pace of development 
of housing, factories, businesses of all kinds, 
shopping centers, and various forms of trans-
portation. As this form of government control 
was decentralized to provinces and munici-
palities, it quickly got out of hand, and be-
came an evergreen source of corruption.  All 
potential land users found that “who do you 
know” and “how much will you pay” had be-
come the criteria on which land use permits 
were determined.  The continued use of land 
also rested on willingness to continue some 
form of “kick-back” forever.  In addition, pub-
lic officials became dictatorial and perverse 
in throwing people off land holdings to make 
way for economic development, and there is 
now a rising tide of public indignation against 
such abuse, especially since the government 
often failed to provide adequate compensation 
or movement of displaced persons to other lo-
cations.  Banks of course were part and parcel 
of these abuses. Government corruption often 
extended to forcing banks to lend to favored 
developers including local governments and 
SOEs, usually with totally inadequate secu-
rity, and without regard to actual risk or asset 
quality.   When it came time for the borrowers 
to repay their loans, they often declined to do 
so, and relied on their political allies to protect 
them.  As a result of these practices, China’s 
banks have outstanding loans of in excess of 
145% of GDP – the highest ratio in the world.
In addition, provincial and municipal gov-
ernments played the same pathological game, 
often forcing banks to “lend” money to finance 
popular public infrastructure such as roads, 
schools, sanitation facilities and public build-
ings.  It is estimated that more than $100 bil-
lion of illegal loans have been made, with very 
little prospects that local government will ever 
repay them.  
5. The tyranny of regulation
One of the most perplexing arenas of gov-
ernance is that of public regulation, which 
has been a “growth industry” in almost every 
country.  Regulation can be one of the most 
valuable means by which governments de-
ploy their power, to protect the public and 
to advance the common good.  Almost every 
country benefits now from proper regulation 
of health protection, public safety, environ-
mental protection, and modulation of the func-
tioning of the economy.  But regulation knows 
few limits; there almost no ground rules to de-
fine where regulations exceed reasonable lim-
its and become instruments of oppression and 
petty tyranny. All regulations are forms of co-
ercion, demand enforcement, and contribute 
to government power and control.
There are two types of government author-
ity that are interlocked: regulation and ad-
ministrative operating procedures. In most 
governments great care is taken to distinguish 
between the two since regulations are derived 
from laws and may themselves have the force 
of law. They usually involve serious enforce-
ment powers including search, seizure, arrests 
and prosecution.  Administrative procedures 
however are used internally in government 
agencies to direct administrative operations, 
and they can usually be changed freely when 
needed, and they are seldom enforceable by 
law.
The entire process of providing a stronger 
basis in law for government regulatory power 
must be considered in the context of the com-
pelling philosophy of centrist control.   Each 
new law creating regulatory authority is, in 
fact, an addition to the reach and authority of 
the government.  While the power to regulate 
is growing, legal restraints on the arbitrary 
exercise of government power often remain 
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weak in practice.
Regulations can usefully be thought of in 
two groups - economic regulation, and health 
and safety or “social” regulation.  In China as 
elsewhere, economic regulations have fallen 
out of favor since they tend to inhibit econom-
ic development freedom.  In most countries, 
but not so much in China, health and safety 
regulations are a “growth industry” and have 
strong public support and popularity. But in 
China, preoccupation with economic regula-
tions meant that many health and safety reg-
ulations have been neglected.  However, the 
SARS scare and huge public disgust seriously 
harmed the government’s reputation and has 
led to new concentration on matters of public 
health.
Regulation has become one of the most pow-
erful tools by which governments enforce their 
will.  The power to regulate can be given to al-
most every government agency, and it is used 
to redirect institutional and individual behav-
ior by defining what is prohibited and what is 
allowed.  The proliferation of regulations is so 
great in some countries that nobody including 
those who write them and enforce them un-
derstands them all, much less understanding 
their consequences, which can be enormous. 
It is unsettling but illuminating to recognize 
how each regulatory authority can be made ei-
ther pathological or corrupt or both.
These problems of destructive regulation 
are ubiquitous, and they are at their worst in 
China. Some countries believe that regulations 
can be used to simply force organizations to 
pay their workers more money, with no rec-
ognition of the economic realties of the orga-
nization. For example, a minimum wage regu-
lation may be set so high that many smaller 
businesses can’t comply and are driven out of 
business or forced into the informal economy. 
Labor standards may require such exceedingly 
expensive compensation for released workers 
that companies avoid hiring them in the first 
place.
There is virtually no serious intellectual rea-
soning that helps to define the limits of regula-
tion.  Almost nothing in society and life is un-
regulated, and nobody can say when it should 
stop and at what level.  The basic questions are 
the hardest to answer:  how safe is safe?  How 
safe is safe enough?  What, in society should 
be left essentially unregulated? When and why 
does regulation become excessive and patho-
logical?  For the regulatory mind, the answer 
seems to be Never! 
Governments have proved universally and 
notoriously unable to regulate themselves. 
State owned enterprises and other government 
monopolies in China are far greater threats to 
public wellbeing than private monopolies ever 
were, and many are deliberately exempt from 
regulatory controls. Laws intended to protect 
the public are often drawn too broadly, giving 
too much room for perverse interpretation, 
and the abuse of power.  Political leaders can 
and do violate even well defined regulations. 
Many regulations contain the power to allo-
cate valuable resources such as land use rights 
or TV broadcasting rights, and this has proved 
to be an enormous source of corruption.
Each regulatory authority defined in some 
enabling statute has precipitated an inevitable 
wave of second and third level regulations gen-
erated by the responsible regulatory agency, 
so voluminous and complicated that nobody 
can understand them all.  This allows politi-
cians and bureaucrats to play the game, much 
favored in China, of “selective” application of 
the regulations they choose to enforce.  Most 
regulations are highly technical and complex, 
and it very difficult to find a basis for challeng-
ing those that are felt to be unnecessary or 
perverse.  This is the major source of power 
for the government interpreters of these regu-
lations, and of potential corruption in govern-
ments.  Once put into place, regulations tend 
to be “forever”, and even in moderate and 
respected governments, enforcement can be 
a very corrosive role since it is used to make 
people or institutions do things that they may 
not want to do .
There are no effective policy, political or 
even intellectual limits on the theoretical pow-
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er of governments to regulate.  There is such a 
thing as “the regulatory mentality” and there 
is a tendency for regulators to expand and ex-
trapolate the range and depth of their regula-
tions.  Abuses of regulatory power have cre-
ated a growing feeling that governments can 
and do go too far, and there are no effective 
means to limit the expansion of such power. 
Regulation is intensely bureaucratic:  compli-
cated, technical hard to understand, and often 
lacking adequate justification for its creation. 
Enforcement is usually costly and time con-
suming, requiring long time delays, and ex-
cessive paperwork.  And regulations, once im-
posed can prove to be highly rigid, difficult to 
change, and almost immortal.
 But most of the time, the power of the 
government is so strong that a  pathological 
regime can easily use regulation as a form of 
tyranny designed deliberately to enhance its 
own power. It is also possible to avoid the 
consequences of regulations that would quash 
corruption such as prohibitions against brib-
ery, influence peddling, money laundering, 
concealment of assets, extortion, malfeasance, 
misfeasance, and others.
6. China’s corrupted environment
Consider the judgments of official sources 
and expert opinions [1] both in China and 
from the outside, about China and the envi-
ronment:
 ▪ Agricultural runoff is “the worst in the world”
 ▪ Soil erosion is “the worst in the world”
 ▪ Desertification is “the worst in the world”
 ▪ Air pollution: China is the world’s largest 
producer of carbon dioxide
 ▪ China has 16 of the 20 world’s most polluted 
cities
 ▪ China suffers from “the worst river water 
cessation in the world”
 ▪ The Yellow River is the most silt clogged in 
the world
 ▪ China is the world’s largest user of coal, the 
world’s largest producer of carbon dioxide, 
and acid rain falls in one third of the country
 ▪ Almost every river in the country is heavily 
polluted
 ▪ 25-40% of all mercury emissions in the 
world come from China
 ▪ Only 20% of waste water is treated
 ▪ In the last half century, 332 Chinese dams 
have failed, including “the worlds worst 
dam disaster” – the Banqiao and Shimanan 
dams in Henan Province which collapsed 
and killed an estimated 80,000 to 200,000 
people.
Finally, anything that can be done can and 
will be done illegally. Consider water poison-
ing, air pollution, soil pollution, food poison-
ing, illegal fisheries,  untreated chemicals, oil 
spills, excessive use of insecticides and pes-
ticides and herbicides, heavy metals in the 
water supply, poisonous chemicals in air and 
water.  Add illegal logging and fires; poaching 
and illegal hunting; uncontrolled handling of 
trash and garbage; poor sanitation, and trash 
full of toxic wastes, especially medical.  Bribery 
and other forms of corruption  deal with all of 
these things. Almost all developing countries 
in the Muslim world are riddled with corrup-
tion.  Estimates suggest that as much as 40% 
of scarce funds destined for water manage-
ment (or anything else) are dissipated in some 
form.
The most “modern” of China’s environmen-
tal disasters is in the air. The amounts of dan-
gerous chemicals pumped into the air are now 
staggering.  China is now the world’s largest 
producer of carbon dioxide.  Air pollution also 
includes excessive and illegal levels of sulphur 
dioxide, chlorofleurocarbons, smoke, dust and 
soil. Even the government’s own State Envi-
ronmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
admits that this is true, and that air pollution is 
getting worse, not better.  It is typical that the 
Chinese government has a full array of nicely 
drafted laws and regulations “controlling” air 
pollution, and there are standards setting lim-
its for every form of emission.  But two thirds 
of China’s cities that have been tested cannot 
meet these standards, or similar standards set 
by the World Health Organization. Nor does 
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anybody seem to have a clue how this pollu-
tion can be brought under control. On the 
contrary, the whole vast tide of industrializa-
tion and urbanization is guaranteed to make 
matters very much worse very fast. One needs 
only to think about the millions of new auto-
mobiles and trucks and airplanes, and the de-
velopment of an additional 562 new coal fired 
power plants, and the addition of many thou-
sands of new or expanded industrial facilities 
to realize what is making air pollution worse.
Finally, and most typically, these environ-
mental disasters pose ever increasing threats 
to the health of China’s citizens. An estimated 
190 million Chinese have had illnesses con-
nected with drinking contaminated water. 
Cities and villages alike have suffered from re-
peated epidemics of diarrhea, and heightened 
rates of cancer, tumors, poisoning from lead, 
mercury and other heavy metals.  Air pollution 
alone is said to have been the cause of up to 
300,000 deaths.  Once again, China’s record is 
worse than any other country on earth. Beijing 
has six times higher air pollution rates than 
New York. Past dust storms are so persistent 
and severe that many people in cities wear face 
masks against dust and chemicals.  There are 
huge worker time losses from lung diseases, 
blood infections, heart diseases, strokes and 
diabetes. There are about 24 million cars to-
day, but in 20 years there may be upwards of 
100 million, most of them in already choked 
cities. 60-90% of rain in Guandong province 
is acid rain, and farmland losses would equal 
the farm land in Britain, Germany and France 
combined.
“Since 1990, according to a report posted 
on the web site of China’s central bank, 
corrupt Chinese officials – about 18,000 of 
them – have collectively funneled some $120 
billion out of the country.  That figure is equiv-
alent to China’s entire education budget be-
tween 1978 and 1998.  Beyond the sheer finan-
cial loss, corruption has also led to extremely 
poor food safety records, sisnce officials are 
paid not to enforce regulations.  A 2007 Asian 
Development Bank report estimated that 300 
million people in China suffer from food-borne 
diseases every year.  In addition, corruption 
leads to bridge and building collapses that kill, 
and chemical factory spills that poison China’s 
environment – and their cover-ups.
China:  Since 1989, the CCP has not adopted 
any genuine political reforms, relying on the 
high rate of growth to maintain its rule.  That 
means that the only period of real reform was 
in the period from 1976 to the late 80’s.  This 
highlights the bravery of Deng Zao Ping.
The one absolute essential for curbing per-
verse political power is to generate and focus 
public attention on the activities of the politi-
cal leadership.  The public will always be con-
cerned; the real question is whether such con-
cern can develop real leverage on the political 
leaders.  This is not mission impossible; there 
are in fact many ways in which this leverage 
can be built.  Even in absolute tyrannies, there 
are tides running which offer opportunities for 
reformist action.  Old tyrants die, and regimes 
change.  Legislatures and judges find windows 
of opportunity to change pathological laws or 
call culprits to account.  Internal conflicts be-
tween elements of the elite may split the re-
gime and open up further opportunities.  And 
even tyrannies can be overthrown, either by 
internal forces, or by external pressures.
7. And now: china’s new wave of 
anti-corruption reform
A far reaching campaign began in China 
following the conclusion of the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(CCP) in 2012.  The campaign, ordered by 
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jin-
ping is emerging as the largest organized anti-
corruption effort in the history of Communist 
rule.  The campaign will be executed largely 
under the direction of the Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection under its Sec-
retary Wang Qushan, along with appropriate 
military and judicial organs, and it has orga-
nized the backing of most of the current and 
past leaders of the Party.  What seems most 
remarkable is that the campaign has visibly 
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broken the old immutable rule guaranteeing 
immunity from criminal proceedings against 
top Party officials that has been the norm since 
the end of the Cultural Revolution.  Consider 
the perverse history: senior and even mid lev-
el officials were untouchable, and it is prov-
ing difficult to sell the idea that the Party, that 
perpetuated that stance can now pretend that 
they are rescuing the country from “it”. Part 
of the answer lies in the pattern of blaming 
everything on somebody else – notably local 
government officials, and the new campaign is 
already returning to this popular theme.
Part of the reality of corruption is that it 
tends to become an entrenched and highly 
secretive and protective group system where, 
with the big guys steal big, the little guys feel 
entitled to steal small.  Then, all band together 
out of fear and the necessity to resist investiga-
tion all up and down the structure.  President 
Xi has recognized this and taken it seriously 
when he speaks about “killing tigers and swat-
ting flies”.  
In a sense there is so much corruption with-
in the Party because there is so much Party. 
The CCP has at least 90 million members and 
they take their membership very seriously, and 
millions of Party members serve directly in 
political and managerial positions throughout 
every aspect of Chinese life.  Relationships be-
tween governments in China are surely heavy 
contributors to the national enthusiasm for 
corruption.  The centrist elite of the CCP are 
arrogant, demanding, oppressive and often 
disturbingly unfair, and it uses its top to bot-
tom Party structure to enforce its will on local 
officials and businesses.  This in turn is widely 
resisted by these people who dodge and spin 
and conceal, avoid responsibility and perform 
to suit themselves.  One of the great sins of the 
system is what American public administra-
tors call the “unfunded mandate”, where the 
central government pushes responsibilities for 
large and expensive programs down onto local 
governments without providing any funds to 
carry them out.
Thus, President Xi faces a huge quandary: 
what is real and illegal corruption vs. the end-
lessly muddled and confusing fumbling of 
China’s extraordinarily complex government 
and society?  Are local government defenses 
against a horrible and oppressive central gov-
ernment corrupt or merely conflicting?  If peo-
ple steal to eat, is this worth the wrath of the 
CCP?  The nature of “corruption” is heavily de-
fined by these kinds of combat between politi-
cal levels, and sometimes tigers bite back and 
flied are not so easy to swat.  One is reminded 
about the ancient Chinese slogan, “The moun-
tains are high and the Emperor is far away.”
It is essential to understand that the one 
single most compelling motive within the Chi-
nese government is the implacable, immuta-
ble preservation of the wellbeing and power of 
the CCP – not the people, not even the coun-
try, but the Party.  Note for example that the 
official Constitutional definition of the role of 
the People’s Liberation Army is not to protect 
the country or the people but to protect the 
Party. Over time, the Chinese world has ex-
perience many changes in its economy and its 
culture, much of it for the better.  What has 
never changed is the absolute control of the 
CCP.  It has weathered the fallout from these 
changes, but it has never shaken the feeling 
that, at some point, such change will become 
so liberating within the country that citizens 
will commit the unforgivable sin of starting 
to think for themselves, and will begin to ask 
“who needs the dictatorial Communist Party? 
To stave off this dread question, President Xi 
appears to be attempting a broad new strate-
gy.  He appear to be betting that he can assume 
the rule of the moralist force in the country for 
himself and the Party and use it to accuse the 
corrupt of moral failure and a lack of moral 
rightiousness.  He quotes Confucius as having 
said “Govern with virtue and keep order thru 
punishments.”  Thus, the stated nature of pub-
lic sin and the causes for punishment are now 
heavily loaded with a wide range of human er-
ror – lying, cheating, gambling, drunkenness, 
absenteeism, nepotism, illegal favoritism and 
– horrors! – “responding to the letters of peo-
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ple.”  Civil servants are subject to extraordi-
nary interventions in their lives in the name 
of the anti-corruption campaign.  They must 
report plans to travel abroad, make changes in 
investments make any large purchases, marry 
or divorce or do “anything else deemed impor-
tant to the Party to know.”
Authorities say that more than 100,000 of-
ficials have been punished so far.  While this 
seems impressive, it is within a Party popula-
tion of more than 90 million, and it is not clear 
how many of the one hundred thousand are ti-
gers rather than flies.  Still, there are reports of 
widespread confusion, muddling and fear, and 
in one of the funniest of recent utterances is a 
quote reported in the official party newspaper 
the People’s Daily, quoting the Hebei Province 
Party Secretary who warned “I am afraid that 
too much punishment of senior officials can 
harm the stability and development of the lo-
cal economy.”  This is like saying “closing down 
street level drug sales can cause youth unem-
ployment”, or “more crime provides valuable 
employment opportunities for more police.”
Still, the current anti-corruption campaign, 
for all of its lurching and staggering, has been 
more prolonged and far-reaching than doubt-
ers expected, and quite a few really large tigers 
have been slain.  It is a reflection of the fact 
that the Party, probably for the first time, real-
ly fear the depth of public disapproval, and the 
fear that it will scale up to outrage or even pub-
lic reaction.  The degree of success has had the 
counter-productive consequence of officially 
revealing to the public the depth of corruption 
that existed and been concealed over decades 
of Party rule, and it may still lead to the public 
conclusion that what is now demanded is not 
just a change of policy but a change of govern-
ment.  Right now, President Xi seems to have 
the public behind him, but increasingly, the 
length of the campaign is showing how diffi-
cult and complicated it is to unravel the enor-
mously complex workings of the Chinese gov-
erning system.
